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Special Interrogation Report 
Brigadefiihrer Kurt Meyer 
Commander 
12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Jugend" 
(6 June - 25 August 1944) 
B rigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer remains a controversial figure in Canadian military 
history. As a commander of Waffen-SS troops 
in Normandy, he fought the Canadians in the 
days and weeks after the Allied landings and 
allegedly ordered the killing of prisoners of war. 
A Canadian military court at Aurich in occupied 
Germany tried and convicted Meyer on charges 
of war crimes. Although sentenced to death, 
Meyer received commutation to life 
imprisonment from the convening authority, 
Major-General Chris Vokes. Meyer was 
imprisoned in New Brunswick and West 
Germany until his release in 1954. Several 
significant political, legal, public opinion, 
diplomatic, and military factors worked 
together to turn Meyer into Canada's most 
notorious war criminal. His trial raised delicate 
issues of command responsibility for the first 
time, while Meyer and his formation, the 12th 
SS Panzer Division, became almost household 
names in some parts of Canada. 
Some Canadians may have genuinely 
hated the man and his ideals, but Meyer 
garnered curiosity and respect for his abilities 
as a fighting officer. A combat veteran of 
campaigns in Poland, the West, the Balkans, 
and the Eastern Front, Meyer felt most 
comfortable at the front of his troops. The 
inclination was borne from years of experience 
in the reconnaissance role and a personal 
disregard for danger. Meyer was among the 
best-regarded silver foxes of the Waffen-SS, the 
combat arm of Heinrich Himmler's 
Schutzstaffel. Meyer likely did not believe that 
he would survive the war; this fact may have 
played some part in his complicity in the killing 
of Canadian prisoners of war behind the lines. 
Winning the battle or to die trying in a heroic 
fashion was always his first concern. After 
being captured alive, Meyer became the subject 
of several interrogations to further 
investigations for his eventual war crimes 
prosecution and to assess Canadian and 
German battlefield performance during the 
Normandy campaign. 
The following document gives good insights 
into Meyer's background, his unwavering 
adherence to the Nazi cause, the obvious pride 
in his formation's conduct, and the tactical 
battles against the Canadians in Normandy. 
This interview was conducted by the G 
Intelligence officer at the HQ of Canadian 
Forces in the Netherlands on 24 August 1945. 
In terms of operational details on the 
battlefield, Meyer demonstrated a remarkable 
memory, which proved less forthcoming on 
other matters during his war crimes trial. 
Meyer obviously inflated his own role and that 
of the troops under his command in operations. 
Canadian interrogators, on the other hand, 
added their own analysis of Meyer's claims. 
While furnishing an important perspective from 
the enemy's side, this interrogation report must 
be used with the standard checks for bias and 
reliability in any primary source. 
Editors 
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Divisional Command 
1. Kurt Meyer, commander of 12th SS Panzer 
"Hitler Jugend," at the age of 35 is the youngest 
German divisional commander. In 1933, he 
became a member of Hitler's body guard and all 
his subsequent service has been with the SS. In 
1939, he fought in the Polish Campaign with the 
Adolf Hitler Division and subsequently in 
Holland and France. As regimental commander, 
he took a leading part in the campaign in Greece, 
and at the outbreak of war with Russia was in 
the forefront of the drive to the East. For three 
years he fought in Russia reaching almost the 
furthest point to be achieved by the German 
forces, deep into the remote Caucasus. Three 
times he was completely encircled by Russian 
forces during the retreat, and fought his way out 
with a handful of survivors. It will be seen that 
his experience instilled into him a thorough 
knowledge of battle tactics, which stood him in 
good stead at the time of the Caen-Falaise battle. 
2. Standing approximately 5 feet 10 inches in 
height, broad shouldered, thick-set, his whole 
appearance dominated by his cold grey-blue 
eyes, which fixed one with what almost amounts 
to a stare whenever he is talking, Kurt Meyer is 
the personification of National Socialism. His 
mind, paralyzed with long propaganda, is quite 
unable to even consider any other point of view. 
His whole outlook is dominated by the peril of 
Russia and the Communist threat to Germany, 
which reason he gives for his wholehearted 
adherence to Hitler and to his teachings. Time 
and again throughout the whole conversation he 
would t u rn , fixing one or o ther of the 
interrogators with the cold stare, saying slowly 
and distinctly, "As I sit here now, Germany in 
five years or less will be Communist." The 
English, he explained, had no idea of Russia, its 
system of life and its people. They would sweep 
away all the western culture such as we know it, 
and would set up in its place their own half 
developed animal-like existence, which could 
only mean the complete disappearance of 
western civilization. When it was suggested to 
him that Russia might have other things to think 
about in the next five or ten years than war, with 
pursed lips and the old familiar state, he replied, 
"Russia will always have both time and the 
necessary resources to do what she likes when 
she likes." This he said was the reason why the 
Fiihrer had led them into the Russian adventure. 
The Fiihrer had realized this peril all along, and 
his one idea was to save Europe from the menace 
of Bolshevism. He ended one of these statements 
with the remark that we should find many in 
the camp who would drag the Fiihrer's name in 
the dust, but he and those SS men with him 
would never associate with these ideas, and 
would always maintain their faith in what he had 
taught them. When he spoke he spoke quietly 
but very firmly. 
3. It seemed worthwhile to run over with such 
a man the pre-war years, and obtain from him 
some idea of how Germany's course of action in 
those years might appear to be justified in the 
eyes of the German people. The whole question 
of Germany's acquisitions prior to the war was 
discussed, and Meyer agreed that the British 
offer to send Lord Runciman to Prague was a 
very reasonable one, but then, of course, the 
British did not really understand the problem. 
Czechoslovakia, he said, had for hundreds of 
years been German, and furthermore, situated 
as it was in the heart of Germany, so long as it 
existed in that state would forever be a peril and 
threat to the very life of the Reich. Could we not 
see, he said, that advanced air bases would soon 
Kurt Meyer sits on a cot in his cell during his war crimes 
trial at Aurich, Germany in December 1945. 
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have been used in Czechoslovakia by the 
Russians. Therefore, in the German process of 
defeating Bolshevism, Czechoslovakia had to go. 
He was unable to give any reply when asked to 
consider whether this was not a very strange way 
of doing business. Against England, Hitler had 
no quarrel, and he, himself, with the 1st SS 
Division which entered Poland on 3 September 
1939, was astonished when he heard that 
England had declared war. He never gave up 
hope of an agreement being reached between 
England and Germany. After the conclusion of 
the campaign in the West, Goering's Luftwaffe 
was not launched against England, nor were 
there any serious thoughts of invasion until Mr. 
Churchill's speeches which emphatically laid 
down that resistance by the British Empire was 
to continue. 
4. This, briefly, may serve as a s l ight 
background to those who are interested in the 
study of this most ardent disciple of Hitler. One 
last point which may serve to demonstrate how 
impossible it is for such as he to be allowed to 
live in the future world as a normal citizen were 
his observations on the German concentration 
camps. Having first denied that he knew anything 
about what happened inside them, as he said 
he had always been away fighting the enemy, he 
was again asked whether he really knew what 
had occurred inside them. Before he could 
answer, a detailed description was given to him 
of what had occurred to two Dutch men 
personally known to the interrogator. He listened 
very quietly and did not reply for a few seconds, 
and then slowly turning he stated, somewhat 
defiantly, that our soldiers had descended to the 
mean trick of taking away watches, rings, and 
private papers from his men. When asked if he 
hones t ly considered th is a r ea sonab le 
comparison, he was quite unable to offer any 
reply. His state of mind, however, is well 
illustrated by this astonishing comparison which 
he solemnly offered as an excuse for the 
bestialities performed by the men wearing the 
same uniform as himself. 
5. On military matters, his mind was crystal 
clear, and once having oriented himself on the 
map he was able to go through the campaign 
phase by phase giving strengths, boundaries, 
tasks, with consummate ease. The whole time, 
however, his conversation was coloured by the 
pride that he had in his men and the way they 
had fought. He attempted to dismiss the part 
played by the Wehrmacht in a few short 
sentences. Time and again when reminded that 
the Wehrmacht had also taken a pretty hard 
knock he would try to dismiss their part as no 
consequence, while showing how if the SS had 
not come to the rescue things would have been 
much worse. To him, the battle of Caen-Falaise 
was magnificent in the best Wagnerian tradition. 
As he described his actions and those of his men, 
it seemed as though he liked to consider himself 
as Siegfried leading his warriors to their death. 
When he described how he came out of the 
Falaise Gap with sixty men, it is likely that the 
familiar strains of the "Twilight of the Gods" were 
echoing in his ears. Such is the man Meyer and 
his story follows. 
The Division Prior to D-Day 
6. Prior to D-Day, Meyer was the commander 
of the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and 
did not take over command of the division until 
13 J u n e on the dea th of the divisional 
commander, Major-General Witt. For four weeks 
prior to 6 June, they had been expecting the 
attack, and he had spent his time familiarizing 
himself with the various courses of action which 
were laid down in advance in case of emergency. 
The division was at full strength with between 
20,000 and 21,000 all ranks and approximately 
214 tanks. The organization of the division 
agreed with the normal organization of an SS 
Armoured Division with exception of the anti-
tank battalion. When asked, he immediately 
filled in the details of the organization of this 
battalion, which at that time were lacking. The 
anti-tank battalion consisted of four companies 
of Panzer IV tanks with long 7.5 cm guns. On 
D-Day, however, he had only 22 of these. The 
other 22 were not received until late in July. 
Within the division were a certain number of 
foreigners, approximately 500, mostly Russians 
and Italians. His own driver was a Russian, who 
gained the Iron Cross, second class. Both Italians 
and Russians were mostly employed with the 
administrative troops. Meyer said that he was 
very familiar with the whole of this District of 
France because he had been stationed in the 
Orne area in 1942 with the 1st SS Panzer 
Division during the time it was refitting after one 
of its many Russian adventures. He found this 
experience invaluable, since he possessed a 
61 
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detailed knowledge not only of the lie of the land, 
but of the communication system including all 
the minor roads. 
Disposition of the Division 
Prior to D-Day 
7. The division prior to D-Day was disposed 
as follows:-
Divisional Headquarters - Aeon 
25th SS Headquarters - La Trinite, with the 
regiment in the general area 
26th SS Headquarters - Dreux, with the regiment 
to the north of the town 
12th SS Panzer Regiment - general area of 
Elbeuf, Louviers, and Neuborg 
The role of the 12th SS was to counter-attack 
any attempt to land north or south of the Seine. 
That was the main reason for having the tank 
regiment so near the Seine. The special task of 
the divisional engineers was to keep the ferries 
open to enable the tank regiment to be used on 
either side of the river. The various courses of 
action, already mentioned, had been most 
carefully worked out so that when the alarm 
actually was given, Case I was immediately 
implemented, and there was no loss of time in 
making up orders for the advance. 
6 June 
8. At 0200 hours on the morning of 6 June, 
Meyer first heard of the landing. He had received 
his news from the radar station situated on the 
coast, with whom he had special liaison 
arrangements. It was not, however, until 1000 
hours that orders were received for the 25th SS 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment plus the Panzer 
abteilung of Panzer IVs to proceed in the 
direction of the coast. At this time, the 12th SS, 
together with the 21st Panzer, were under direct 
command of Panzer Gruppe-West. The first task 
of this composite battle group was to move in 
the direction of Houlgate, since it was thought 
that the landing that had already occurred might 
be a feint and that the major blow was to fall to 
the east of the Orne. On their way up, Meyer 
received orders at 1500 hours when he was at 
St. Pierre-sur-Dives to change direction and go 
towards Caen and establish communications 
with the 21st Panzer Division. The regiment 
reached Brettevile-sur-Laize at 2200 hours, and 
62 
pushed on the Evrecy. At midnight 6-7 June, 
Meyer went into conference with Feuchtinger of 
the 21st Panzer Division in Caen, and discussed 
the position with him. He is reported by 
Feuchtinger [commander of 21st Panzer] to have 
considered the British as little fish, adding that 
in no time he would have the situation under 
control. It was apparently Feuchtinger's idea to 
await the arrival of all three divisions, namely, 
Panzer Lehr, 12th SS and 21st Panzer before 
launching a counter-attack, but in this he, 
Feuchtinger, was over-ruled, and on 7 June, it 
was decided that 25th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment with the Panzer IVs should attempt to 
drive through to the sea between Cambes and 
Cairon. Left flank protection was to be provided 
by the reconnaissance company up to Tilly-sur-
Seulles. On 7 June, this attack was actually 
l aunched and succeeded in driving the 
Canadians from the western approaches to Caen. 
By the night of 7 June , the line had been 
stabilized with the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment's right flank on the Caen-Bayeux road. 
Meyer was asked why this attack had not been 
successful in achieving more substantial results; 
he replied that though they had made every effort 
they were unable to do what they wanted owing 
to the complete lack of petrol and a certain lack 
of ammunition. In fact, his tanks were brought 
to a complete standstill, which resulted in the 
attack failing in its final objectives. Meyer, in 
describing the attack said that our tanks had 
actually reached R9969 about two miles from 
Caen. His own attack was made with about 40 
to 50 tanks, and in the course of the action, he 
lost approximately 6. The line was then 
stabilized through Galmanche, Buron, Gruchy, 
and Point 69. 
(Note: Feuchtinger, when questioned on his 
reason for the failure of the 12th SS, said that 
the lack of petrol was quite untrue since he, 
himself, would willingly have given Meyer all the 
petrol he needed had he asked for it. Feuchtinger 
states that the reason for the failure of the attack 
of the 12th SS was because our anti-tank 
defences were first class). 
9 June to 7 July 
9. On 9 June, the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment came up and took over the left flank 
of the divisional sector up to Tilly-sur-Seulles. 
At this time, Meyer spoke of the conference held 
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 4, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss4/6
A Panther of the 12th SS knocked out in Brefteville-l'Orgueilleuse by the Regina Rifle Regiment on the night of 8 June 
1944. Meyer's interrogators remark that his mind was "crystal clear" on military matters, but he does not comment on his 
his failure to capture the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade position in a series of attacks launched between 7 and 10 June. 
with Geyr von Schweppenburg [commander of 
Panzer Gruppe-West] when it was agreed to put 
forward to the High Command in the strongest 
terms that further resistance in Normandy 
against the overwhelming mass of Allied strength 
both on land and in the air could only end in 
disaster; and furthermore, they would advise 
that steps should be taken at once to retire on 
to the Seine, using their armoured formations 
to get the infantry out, thereby giving the infantry 
the chance to get back behind the Seine. 
Needless to say, nothing came of this conference 
or of the advice proffered to the High Command. 
10. On 8 June, the 12th SS Division came under 
command of the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Between 
10 and 15 J u n e , the 12th SS Division 
endeavoured to limit our progress by a series of 
counter-attacks on the left flank between Tilly-
sur-Seulles and the Caen-Bayeux road. At this 
time, they were heavily reinforced with artillery, 
which included a flak regiment of 88s, one Werfer 
brigade with two regiments, a heavy artillery 
abteilung consisting of two 17 cm batteries and 
one 21 cm battery, and an additional artillery 
regiment. During this period and up until the 
time that the 12th SS Panzer Division shortened 
its line to take over from Gruchy through 
Carpiquet to the woods at Tourville, especially 
the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the 
engineer battalion incurred heavy losses. In 
addition, the division was forced to send help 
in the shape of one battalion of the tank regiment 
to the Panzer Lehr Division, who as a result of 
the fighting had become perilously weak. On 27 
J u n e , it was stated in Allied Intelligence 
Summaries that the 21st Panzer Division and 
12th SS Panzer Division were desperately in 
need of re in forcements . This was no 
understatement, and though help was given by 
a regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which 
came on 28 June, the 12th SS Panzer Division 
was forced to take up the new positions 
aforementioned to the west of Caen through 
Carpiquet etc. because as a result of the losses 
incur red they were unab le to ma in ta in 
themselves on their original front. Furthermore, 
the 2nd SS Panzer Corps with the 9th and 10th 
SS Divisions had made its appearance, thus 
relieving the immediate s i tuat ion. Meyer 
declared that territorially the positions through 
Carpiquet were much more favourable. By the 
end of June, his total losses were 1500 men and 
over 20 tanks. He had also given a tank battalion 
and an armoured infantry battalion to Panzer 
Lehr. In the battle prior to falling back on 
Carpiquet, his losses totaled a further 800 men. 
Meyer interposed with a remark that during this 
63 
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bitter fighting he knew of three separate cases 
in which one of his men had tied explosives to 
his body and jumped on an Allied tank. 
8 July 
11. As a result of the allied attack on Caen, the 
division again endured heavy losses, the 25th 
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment being the chief 
sufferer, the first battalion having only 200 men 
left, the second battalion a like number and the 
third battalion hardly 100. The losses were 
caused not by the allied bomber attacks, but 
mainly by the flame throwers that attacked 
immediately after the bombing ceased, and as 
result, caught many of the men in a somewhat 
dazed condition. It was only the arrival of the 
21 st Panzer Division that saved what might have 
been a very ugly situation. Waldmuller of the 25th 
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment together with 
Wunsche of the 12th SS Panzer were able to offer 
some assistance to the 16th Luftwaffe Division 
in their predicament, but their combined losses 
had been too great and they fell back to the Orne 
where 12th SS took over from point U035672 
to Maltot. They were, however, only two days (13 
and 14 July) in these positions when they were 
themselves relieved by the 1st SS. About 14 July, 
the division was ordered into a rest area in the 
general area St. Sylvian, Cauvicourt, Bretteville-
la-Rabet, and Soumont. Divisional headquarters 
was at Secqueville. By this time, it was indeed 
an emaciated division. The reconnaissance 
battalion, one artillery battery, one complete 
Kurt Meyer (left) talks with other German officers in the 
courtyard of the Abbaye d'Ardenne, June 1944. 
regiment, and approximately 140 tanks had been 
lost. They were receiving no reinforcements 
except the odd Marsch battalion, which In no 
way could make up for the staggering losses 
which they had taken. Tank reinforcements they 
had none. Clearly, the division could not 
continue to operate under the old organization 
with so many of its best men fallen. With the 
idea of producing three units which would 
incorporate the essentials of a Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment, Meyer reorganized the division into a 
series of battle groups, namely Waldmuller, 
Krause, and Olbotter. In these groups, they 
fought till the end in the Falaise Gap. 
17 July 
12. On 17 July, the tanks of the 12th SS Panzer 
Regiment were ordered up into the area occupied 
by the 86th Corps, north of the Caen-Vimont 
road, since the corps commander had applied 
for help, appreciating that there was to be a 
further landing or a new allied thrust from the 
Orne bridgehead. The tanks, however, remained 
only 24 hours and then returned. 
18 July 
13. 18 July saw the opening of a large-scale 
Allied attack, by name Operation "Goodwood," 
but it was not until 20 July that the 12th SS 
actually took over the sector of the line that lay 
between Emieville and La Hogue. The strength 
of the division at this time was approximately 
2,000 fighting men only. The tank regiment 
consisted of about 50 tanks. From about 20 July 
until the opening of Operation "Totalize" on 8 
August, a period of comparative peace and quiet 
ensued for the division. Though the men were 
rested and the equipment over-hauled, no 
reinforcements came to them and their overall 
weakness was, therefore, not rectified. It had 
been the plan to relieve the 12th SS by the 116th 
Panzer Division, which moved into the area 
around St. Pierre-sur-Dives. But, as a result of 
the Allied progress, the 116th Panzer Division 
was moved off elsewhere in an attempt to cope 
with the serious situation that was beginning to 
develop in the West. 
64 
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14 During this static period, the main tasks of 
the 12th SS, whose headquarters was in the 
wood at U1968, were the construction of three 
defence lines. All the divisions, the 21st Panzer 
on its right and the 1st SS on its left, were 
similarly employed since it was felt that some 
form of Allied attack to break the German grip 
on Caen was the most likely move in the near 
future. Appreciating this, Meyer realized that we 
would be urgently in need of information 
concerning his intentions and his strength. He 
ordered, therefore, that by day the companies 
should sleep except for two or three sentries. At 
sun down, every company would stand-to and 
maintain an alert throughout the hours of 
darkness. In this way, Meyer was able to 
neutralize our patrols and prevent them from 
taking back information, which they were sent 
to procure. All the tank and artillery crews were 
employed on the construction of these three 
defence lines, which they were busily preparing. 
The first was a series of battle outposts, which 
extended from La Hogue on the left up to 
approximately the wood U1564. The second ran 
from Point 33 to Bellengreville turning east 
toward Argences and then north along the high 
ground. The third line followed the course of 
the Muance River. At this time, one of the first 
Flak Sturm regiments of the 111 st Flak Corps 
took up positions on the third line, namely the 
R Muance. Along the second line, Meyer had had 
constructed approximately 40 dummy tanks 
which, however, he backed up with 5 real ones. 
These tanks, made of wood, were constructed 
with the idea of concealing the true location of 
the tank regiment, which at this time was down 
to about 40 to 50 runners. The real location of 
the tank regiment was just to the south of 
Vimont, where they were kept successfully 
camouflaged, ready, however, to go into action 
should an armoured breakthrough occur. During 
this static period, however, the rest of the anti-
tank battalion, namely 22 Mark IVs arrived, but 
before they could go into action they had to be 
thoroughly overhauled and their guns calibrated. 
Both Rommel and von Kluge, commander-in-
chief West visited the 12th SS and on one 
occasion at 0400 hours von Kluge with Meyer 
went up to visit the forward infantry positions. 
Approximately 29 July, the 21st Panzer Division, 
right hand neighbour of the 12th SS, was 
relieved by the 272nd Infantry Division, and as 
the regiments of the 272nd Infantry Division 
Soldiers from the 12th SS Division in Normandy. 
arrived, gradually began to take over the sector 
of the 12th SS Panzer Division. On 5 August, 
the 12th SS had in fact been fully relieved by 
the 272nd Infantry Division. The division was 
b rough t out and went back into the 
neighbourhood of the Liason River and had a 
few hours of rest completely out of the line. The 
object of this move was to have available an 
armoured reserve between the Orne and the sea 
should the Allies attempt to break through south 
from Caen. In order that the Allies should believe 
the 12th SS was still in its old area, Meyer left 
behind near Vimont, a wireless set in a 
Volkswagen with orders to transmit on the tank 
regiment frequency (Note: It will be remembered 
that these relays were in fact picked up by our 
own special wireless units). 
15. Hardly had they been in this position more 
than a few hours when an appeal came from the 
German forces struggling to hold off the British, 
who were attempting to cross the Orne near the 
forest of Grimbosq. Krause of the 26th SS 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment was sent off with 200 
men and 20 tanks to help the sorely-pressed 
277th Infantry Division. 
Operation "Totalize" 
16. Meyer realized that this period of rest north 
of Falaise could only be as a drop in the ocean. 
While he was up in the Vimont area, he had 
noticed that great activity was going on in the 
Allied lines. Furthermore, with the situation 
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Perfoming maintenance on a camouflaged German tank in Normandy. 
deteriorating so rapidly on the Orne front, an 
attempt to break the German defences around 
Caen was over-due. He had ensured against 
being taken by surprise by placing liaison officers 
with the 277th and 89th Infantry Divisions, so 
that if an alarm was raised he would at once be 
fully informed. On the night of 7-8 August, 
Operation "Totalize" commenced. The Allies had 
already pene t ra ted to Roquancour t and 
Garcelles when the alarm reached the 12th SS. 
Meyer at once got into his car and went to Urville, 
where he met the divisional commander of the 
89th Division, who as a result of the bombing 
had little or no idea of the true situation. He 
went by the Caen-Falaise road and found himself 
in the middle of the bombing. In his own words, 
he described the situation thus: "I got out of my 
car and my knees were trembling, the sweat was 
pouring down my face, and my clothes were 
soaked with perspiration. It was not that I was 
particularly anxious for myself because my 
experiences of the last five years had inured me 
against fear of death, but I realized if I failed 
now and if I did not deploy my division correctly, 
the Allies would be through to Falaise, and the 
German armies in the west completely trapped. 
I knew how weak my division was and the double 
task which confronted me gave me at that time 
some of the worst moments I have ever had in 
my life." At the same time as Meyer was up on 
that road alone, groups of the 89th Division 
scattered in panic by the bombing, were making 
their way down the Caen-Falaise road as quickly 
as possible. Meyer, on perceiving this serious 
situation, calmly lit a cigar, stood in the middle 
of the road and in a loud voice asked them if 
they were going to leave him alone to cope with 
the Allied attack when it came. One look at this 
66 
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young commander was enough and the men 
turned around and immediately started to take 
up defensive positions. He must certainly have 
looked an impressive figure, this 35-year-old 
divisional commander, wearing the highest 
decorations that the Germans could bestow on 
him, quietly but confidently facing this disorderly 
mob and by his example and sheer 
determination influencing the whole division to 
turn back into line and take up the fight once 
more. 
17. Prior to leaving the 89 th Division's 
headquarters, Meyer had ordered two things: 
first that Waldmuller and a mixed bag of 20 
tanks, Tigers, Panthers, and IVs, should come 
up and take up positions on either side of the 
Caen-Falaise road at Cintheaux. The Tigers had 
come from the 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion, 
which joined them just prior to this action, and 
consisted of about eight to ten tanks. The object 
of moving this battle group to this position was 
to stop a breakthrough down the main axis of 
advance towards Falaise. The second thing that 
Meyer ordered was that Krause, who had been 
opposing the British, should return at once and 
then together with Waldmuller, should launch a 
counter-attack. 
6 August 
18. As a result of the orders given by Meyer, the 
tanks of Krause arrived in two hours, though 
his infantry was somewhat slower. The first 
tanks, which were seen early on the morning of 
8 August, were part of Waldmuller's group which 
was observed moving up the Caen-Falaise road, 
prior to taking up a defensive position around 
Cintheaux. As it has already been mentioned, 
Krause was also directed to this place, and once 
he had arrived, a combined infantry and tank 
attack was made against the woods at U0956, 
which, however, was beaten off with losses. 
19. In this action, Captain Wittman, of the 101st 
Heavy Tank Battalion, was killed. This officer 
held the record for the number of tanks knocked 
out by one individual. Since 1943, on the 
Russian Front, until the time he was killed in 
Normandy, he was officially credited with having 
knocked out 143 tanks of all kinds. At the time 
of his death, he was part of the crew of a Tiger 
tank. It has been estimated on 9 August, that 
the 12th SS Tank Regiment contained 40 Mark 
IVs, 30 Panzers, and the 101st Heavy Tank 
Battalion contained 20 Tigers. In fact, according 
to Meyer they had only a total of 40 tanks in the 
Panzer regiment, and the 101st Heavy Tank 
Battalion had only 10. As an afterthought, he 
mentioned that there were three assault guns 
from Panzer Abteilung 301 available. 
20. At the same time as the German counter-
a t tack failed agains t the woods already 
mentioned, the Canad ians s t ruck heavy 
opposition south of the woods in U1160. This 
opposition came mainly from approximately 20 
Panzer IVs belonging to the anti-tank battalion 
of the 12th SS, who, unable to move across at 
the time the division moved into reserve owing 
to troubles of one kind or another, now emerged, 
all repairs completed. As a result of the day's 
action and despite the fierce resistance of the 
12th SS in company with what remained of the 
89th Division, the whole German line was forced 
back some 5-6 kilometres. 
8 and 9 August 
21. During the night of 8-9 August, the infantry 
of Krause's group arrived, and were put in south 
of Bretteville-sur-Laize. In this way, although the 
village itself had been captured, Meyer hoped to 
limit our progress on the left flank with the aid 
of these additional troops. The infantry and 
tanks of Waldmuller, who, it will be remembered, 
were primarily responsible for the first counter-
attack, had by their action stayed longer than 
was wise, since the Polish Armoured Division 
had all but encircled them. 
22. As a result of the day's events, Meyer, 
realizing the strength of the Allied thrust, decided 
on a new defensive line. He, therefore, went back 
to carry out personal reconnaissance of the new 
position which he had chosen, and which he, 
through long experience, knew so well, namely 
the Liason Valley. As a r e su l t of h is 
reconnaissance, he gave the following orders: 
Waldmuller was ordered to pull out and make 
his way back to Maizieres, via St. Sylvian. Krause 
was ordered to fall back and take up position in 
the Quesnay Woods, and protect the left flank 
by holding Fontaine-le-Pin. The artillery was to 
concentrate around Olendon and Tassilly, with 
the task of covering the whole divisional front 
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from including Fontaine-le-Pin to his right 
boundary, which passed some 2000 metres east 
of Maizieres. In addition to the normal divisional 
artillery, Meyer had the assistance of a flak sturm 
regiment of approximately 30 to 40 88s, and a 
Werfer Abteilung. 
23. The preparations, which were witnessed on 
9 August by Allied aircraft along the whole valley 
of the Liason were, in fact, Meyer's orders of 8-
9 August being implemented, with Krause falling 
back on the left, and Waldmuller pulling back 
on the right flank. The latter, however, had a very 
sticky time and incurred heavy losses. At the 
same time as the withdrawal was taking place 
on the flanks, the centre was being mainly held 
by Wunsche with some 20 tanks. The Allied 
tanks had made a dangerous thrust towards the 
wood of U1348. On the left, Krause was in 
position in the Quesnay woods with about 200 
men. Wunsche, collecting everything that he had, 
was able to throw back the Allied thrust, which 
if it had succeeded, would have broken the whole 
of the Liason position before they had had time 
to man it. On the night of 9-10 August, 
Waldmuller succeeded in returning to the Liason 
Valley and took up position from Vieux-Fumes, 
to the woods in U1649. 
24. It will be seen at this time that the 12th SS 
was going though the most critical stage in its 
career. Its divisional sector extended for 
approximately 9 miles, and its strength was 
down to 400 to 500 fighting men and 16 tanks. 
The only help that it had was from the remnants 
of the 89th Infantry Division, which, Meyer 
admitted, was worth very little. On the other 
hand, the 85th Division was on the point of 
coming in, and, in fact, the cyclist companies 
were already arriving, bu t the divisional 
commander's statement will be well understood 
when he said that if help was not forthcoming 
in the immediate future, he could not hold 
himself responsible for the further defence of 
Falaise. His troops had been in action practically 
continuously since D-Day, and were in urgent 
need of rest and refit. Finally, they were reduced 
to a mere handful. The once proud Hitler Youth 
Division, consisting of 21,000 men and 220 
tanks was down to a fighting strength of 450 to 
500 men and 16 tanks. 
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10 August 
25. The main event of 10 August was the arrival 
of the 85th Division, who took over from the 
right flank, which was previously occupied by 
Waldmuller and extended to Vieux Fumes, to the 
Caen-Falaise road on the left. It was a gradual 
process, as the division came in according to 
the usual German style, namely in small groups. 
26. The appearance of the 85th Division had one 
important immediate result. It meant that what 
was left of Waldmuller 's group could be 
withdrawn from the battle and sent out to form 
the basis of a new Hitler Jugend Division, which 
had already been decided upon. Meyer admitted 
that it was normal German practice to withdraw 
the remnants of good fighting troops from good 
divisions, before they were entirely wiped out, 
so that a cadre at least, of experienced troops 
would be available for re-building the division. 
From 11 August - Disappearance of 
the 12th SS as a Fighting Formation 
27. From 11 August to the time when Meyer 
finally came out of the gap by himself on foot, 
the story of the 12th SS Panzer Division is very 
much the same. Its main tasks consisted of 
taking up a series of defensive positions with 
gradually decreasing numbers, ending up in the 
neighbourhood of Trun, where as a division it 
disappeared almost entirely. 
28. Once the 85th Division had taken over, the 
infantry of the 12th SS were brought out for a 
two day rest, though the tanks and the artillery 
remained in battle. Before the 12th SS finally 
left the Liason Valley, 50 men and a few tanks 
under Olbotter were sent by Krause to Bray-en-
Cinglais to help out the remnants of the 89th 
Division. On 14 August, when the Allied attack 
opened with the object of crossing the Liason 
Valley and driving on Falaise, the 12th SS was 
thus placed: infantry out of the line, tanks and 
artillery supporting the 85th Infantry Division 
and the 89th Infantry Division. At this point, 
Meyer interposed with the remark that never in 
his life had he seen his infantry so completely 
tired out. They came out of the lines asleep and 
they slept solidly for two days. To these soldiers 
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rest was more important than food; in his own 
words, they were completely out. 
29. The sector that the 12th SS occupied behind 
the Liason Valley was in the neighborhood of 
Olendon-Falaise-Damblainville. This period of 
rest did not last long and with the Allied threat 
growing more dangerous hourly through the fall 
of the Liason Valley position, the 12th SS 
Division, now reduced to 300 men and 11 tanks, 
was once more brought in for the final defence 
of Falaise. The actual positions that were taken 
up by the division were pointed out by Meyer. 
The division was split as follows: 80 men in 
Falaise, who it will be remembered, were 
the scene with some 300 reinforcements and 
what he had been able to procure from the 
administrative troops, who had left the area over 
ten days before. He, according to Meyer, was 
given the task of keeping the exit from the 
Cauldron open. Meyer was not certain where 
Waldmuller was located but believed it to be in 
the area of Grand-Mesnil. One last position was 
taken up by the last 60 men of the 12th SS inside 
the cau ld ron ; th is pos i t ion was in the 
neighbourhood of Vignates. When this had finally 
been over-run, Meyer reported for orders to 
Hausser, commander of the 7th Army, who was 
still inside the cauldron, and it was arranged 
that he, together with Meindl of the 2nd 
A boneyard filled with destroyed and captured German armour southeast of Falaise. 
completely wiped out in the post office, 100 men 
from the northern outskirts of the Bois-du-Roi 
to the Caen-Falaise road, 20 men at Point 159, 
20 men in the wood at U1640, and 50 men in 
Les Monts D'Erames. Olbotter still remained 
with the 89th Division and had with him still 
his two tanks. 
30. The only items of interest before Falaise 
finally fell were two counter-attacks by Wiinsche 
at Epaney and up the Caen-Falaise road. Meyer 
also spoke of the last stand of Krause on the 
Caen-Falaise road with heavy infantry guns with 
which he fought to the end. On 16 August, Falaise 
fell, and the remains of the 12th SS took new 
positions on the high ground to the south of the 
town, extending from Point 182 on the left to 
Les Moutiers-en-Auge on the right. These 
positions were manned by 120 men and six 
tanks. At this stage, Waldmuller came back on 
Parachute Corps and Schimpf of the 3rd 
Parachute Division, make a concentrated 
attempt to break out south of Trun. They 
became, however, separated, and all Meyer can 
say is that he personally came out of the gap by 
himself, led out by a French civilian. Thus ends 
the story of the 12th SS and the part it took in 
the Caen-Falaise battle. As a formation, it had 
been entirely annihilated, and would have ceased 
to exist altogether, had not Waldmuller been 
withdrawn. 
31. It would appear from the past description 
as if the 12th SS had been the only formation 
that had been responsible for this series of well-
fought defensive battles. Meyer spoke as if no 
other division, except the 12th SS, had taken 
part at all. Of the 89th Division and the 85th 
Infantry Division, he spoke little and dismissed 
their contribution in a few trite remarks. The 
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12th SS was the division, his men had borne 
uncomplainingly the burden and heat of the 
battle, which in his long experience was the 
toughest he had ever fought. He had never 
experienced such overwhelming might against 
him either from the land or from the air. He 
remained to the end intensely proud of the deeds 
and exploits of his division, which he reckoned 
had never put up a better show. 
32. Naturally, therefore, with a man imbued with 
such ideas about his own troops, there was little 
room left for praise of the other troops who took 
part despite the fact that on a number of 
occasions both the infantry divisions fought well. 
The 12th SS had defended Falaise, the 12th SS 
had had the vast sector to defend, the 12th SS 
had had the responsibility of saving the German 
Army from being completely mopped up and it 
had carried out its tasks to the best of its ability, 
and incidental ly , t ha t of the divisional 
commander. Thus spoke the fanatic Meyer, the 
intrepid young divisional commander. 
General Remarks 
33. The few general remarks that Meyer had 
made on the fighting may be of interest. He said 
that there was one thing to which he must draw 
our attention, and that was the lack of wireless 
security of the Allied forces who opposed him. 
It was not only within units that it was bad, but 
frequently orders were given over the air by 
senior commanders who should have known 
better, which he was able to pick up and 
immediately initiate counter-measures before the 
orders were implemented by the Allied troops. 
Frequently, he would get warning of our attacks 
in this way, and as frequently, he was able to 
neutralize them. 
34. Another cr i t ic ism he made was the 
astonishing amount of valuable material carried 
in tanks. Code signs, simple map codes, cover 
names for places, not for one day but sometimes 
for 3 and 4 days, were frequently found on 
captured tanks. In fact, so valuable did this 
prove, that it was always an accepted process to 
let an Allied tank come into the German lines 
before knocking it out, so that these valuable 
stocks of codes, etc. could be obtained. On the 
question of our air superiority, he said that he 
thought this was one of the greatest factors in 
our success, not through our heavy bomber 
attacks, but the fighter-bomber, which harassed 
him from early morning to dewy dusk. The 
attacks on headquarters he confirmed as being 
very accurate. His rear headquarters, at one 
stage was severely engaged at Urville and many 
vehicles were knocked out. At the time of the 
attack on his headquarters to the east of Bons-
Tassilly in the Liason Valley, he himself was 
within a stone's throw of the building. He saw 
the building go up in flames, and stood there, 
as an interested eyewitness. Speaking in general 
of the fighting on the Liason Valley, he said that 
he had exploited the mobility of his tanks, in 
order to deceive the Allies of the numbers 
available. Directly after a tank had shot, it 
immediately changed position, giving the 
impression of many more than were actually 
there. On the work of the 88s he spoke 
enthusiastically, especially of the action at Point 
195 when he inflicted a heavy defeat on our own 
armour. He never quite understood why we had 
let ourselves get into this situation, but he said, 
"Once you were in that position, we did not 
hesitate to make you pay for it." 
35. On the general form of the invasion, he 
confirmed exactly what Feuchtinger, commander 
of the 21 st Panzer Division, had said respecting 
the schemes of Rommel and Rundstedt to defeat 
the Allied landings. Rommel wanted everything, 
including the armoured forces on the coast, so 
that the invasion could be defeated on the 
beaches. Rundstedt, however, preferred to have 
his armour in reserve and to use it as a mobile 
counter-attack force. One last point; during some 
of this conversation, Wunsche, commander of 
the 12th Panzer Regiment, was present. Slightly 
younger than Meyer, decorated like a Christmas 
tree, he was a similar example of the system as 
Meyer. His ideas and general philosophy of life 
were stated in exactly the same terms as those 
of Meyer. In appearance he was approximately 
6 feet 4 inches in height, broad-shouldered, 
though by no means stout. A good-looking man, 
blonde, with eyes not unlike Meyer's, and in one 
phase the perfect example of Aryan youth as laid 
down in the pages of "Mein Kampf." 
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